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Abstract
Consider a platform that wants to learn a personalized policy for each
user, but the platform faces the risk of a user abandoning the platform
if she is dissatisfied with the actions of the platform. For example, a
platform is interested in personalizing the number of newsletters it sends,
but faces the risk that the user unsubscribes forever. We propose a gen-
eral thresholded learning model for scenarios like this, and discuss the
structure of optimal policies. We describe salient features of optimal per-
sonalization algorithms and how feedback the platform receives impacts
the results. Furthermore, we investigate how the platform can efficiently
learn the heterogeneity across users by interacting with a population and
provide performance guarantees.
1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms are increasingly intermediating interactions be-
tween platforms and their users. As a result, users’ interaction with the algo-
rithms will impact optimal learning strategies; we investigate this consequence
in our work. In the setting we consider, a platform wants to personalize service
to each user. The distinctive feature in this work is that the platform faces the
risk of a user abandoning the platform if she is dissatisfied with the actions of
the platform. Algorithms designed by the platform thus need to be careful to
avoid losing users.
There are many examples of such settings. In the near future, smart energy
meters will be able to throttle consumers’ energy consumption to increase effi-
ciency of the power grid during peak demand, e.g., by raising or lowering the
level of air conditioning. This can lead to cost savings for both utility com-
panies and consumers. However, if the utility company is too aggressive in its
throttling of energy, a user might abandon the program. Due to heterogeneity
in housing, appliances and preferences of customers, it is important that utility
companies learn personalized strategies for each consumer.
Content creators (e.g., news sites, blogs, etc.) face a similar problem with e-
mail dissemination. There is value in sending more e-mails, but each e-mail also
risks the recipient unsubscribing, taking away any opportunity of the creator to
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interact with the user in the future. Yet another example is that of mobile app
notifications. These can be used to improve user engagement and experience.
However if the platform sends too many notifications, an upset user might turn
off notifications from the application.
In all of the above scenarios, we face a decision problem where “more is
better;” however, there is a threshold beyond which the user abandons and no
further rewards are gained. This work focuses on developing insight into the
structure of optimal learning strategies in such settings. We are particularly
interested in understanding when such strategies take on a “simple” structure,
as we elaborate below.
In Section 2, we introduce a benchmark model of learning with abandonment.
In the initial model we consider, a platform interacts with a single user over
time. The user has a threshold θ drawn from a distribution F , and at each
time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . the platform chooses an action xt. If xt ever exceeds θ, the
user abandons; otherwise, the user stays, and the platform earns some reward
dependent on xt.
We first consider the case where the distribution F and the reward function
are known known (say, from prior estimation), and the challenge is finding an
optimal strategy for a given new user. We consider the problem of maximizing
expected discounted reward. Intuitively, we might expect that the optimal
policy is increasing and depends on the discount factor: in particular, we might
try to serve the user at increasing levels of xt as long as we see they did not
abandon. Surprisingly, our main result shows this is not the case: that in fact,
the static policy of maximizing one-step reward is optimal for this problem.
Essentially, because the user abandons if the threshold is ever crossed, there is
no value to trying to actively learn the threshold.
In Section 3, we consider how to adapt our results when F and/or the reward
function are unknown. In this case, the platform can learn over multiple user
arrivals. We relate the problem to one of learning an unknown demand curve,
and suggest an approach to efficiently learning the threshold distribution F and
the reward function.
Finally in Section 4, we consider a more general model with “soft” abandon-
ment: after a negative experience, users may not abandon entirely, but continue
with the platform with some probability. We characterize the structure of an
optimal policy to maximize expected discounted reward on a per-user basis; in
particular, we find that the policy adaptively experiments until it has sufficient
confidence, and then commits to a static action. We empirically investigate the
structure of the optimal policy as well.
Related work The abandonment setting is quite unique, and we are aware
of only one other work that addresses the same setting. Independently from
this work, Lu et al. [2017] model the abandonment problem using only two
actions; the safe action and the risky action. This naturally leads to rather
different results. There are some similarities with the mechanism design liter-
ature, though there the focus is on strategic behavior by agents [Rothschild,
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1974, Myerson, 1981, Farias and Van Roy, 2010, Pavan et al., 2014, Lobel and
Paes Leme, 2017]. As in this work, the revenue management literature considers
agents with heuristic behaviour, but the main focus is on dealing with a finite
inventory [Gallego and Van Ryzin, 1994].
It may seem that our problem is closely related to many problems in rein-
forcement learning (RL) [Sutton and Barto, 1998] due to the dynamic structure
of our problem. However, there are important differences. Our focus is on
personalization; viewed through the RL lens, this corresponds to having only
a single episode to learn, which is independent of other episodes (users). On
the other hand, in RL the focus is on learning an optimal policy using multi-
ple episodes where information carries over between episodes. These differences
present novel challenges in the abandonment setting, and necessitate use of the
structure present in this setting.
Also related is work on safe reinforcement learning, where catastrophic states
need to be avoided [Moldovan and Abbeel, 2012, Berkenkamp et al., 2017]. In
such a setting, the learner usually has access to additional information, for
example a safe region is given. Finally, we note that in our work, unlike in safe
RL, avoiding abandonment is not a hard constraint.
2 Threshold model
In this section, we formalize the problem of finding a personalized policy for a
single user without further feedback.
2.1 Formal setup and notation
We consider a setting where heterogeneous users interact with a platform at
discrete time steps indexed by t, and focus on the problem of finding a per-
sonalized policy for a single user. The user is characterized by sequence of
hidden thresholds {θt}∞t=0 jointly drawn from a known distribution that models
the heterogeneity across users. At every time t, the platform selects an action
xt ∈ X ⊂ R+ from a given closed set X. Based on the chosen action xt, the
platform obtains the random reward Rt(xt) ≥ 0. The expected reward of action
x is given by r(x) = E(Rt(x)) < ∞, which we assume to be stationary and
known to the platform.1 While not required for our results, we expect r to be
increasing. When the action exceeds the threshold at time t, the process stops.
More formally, let T be the stopping time that denotes the first time the xt
exceeds the threshold θt:
T = min{t : xt > θt}. (1)
The goal is to find a sequence of actions {xt}∞t=0 that maximizes:
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
γtRt(xt)
]
, (2)
1Section 3 discusses the case when both F and r are unknown.
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where γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor. We note that this expectation
is well defined even if T = ∞, since γ < 1. We focus here on the discounted
expected reward criterion. An alternative approach is to consider maximizing
average reward on a finite horizon; considering this problem remains an inter-
esting direction for future work.
2.2 Optimal policies
Without imposing further restrictions on the structure of the stochastic thresh-
old process, the solution is intractable. Thus, we first consider two extreme
cases: (1) the threshold is sampled at the start and then remains fixed across
time; and (2) the thresholds are independent across time. Thereafter, we look
at the robustness of the results when we deviate from these extreme scenarios.
Fixed threshold We first consider a case where the threshold is sampled at
the beginning of the horizon, but then remains fixed. In other words, for all
t, θt = θ ∼ F . Intuitively, we might expect that the platform might try to
gradually learn this threshold, by starting with xt low and increasing it as long
as the user does not abandon. In fact, we find something quite different: our
main result is that the optimal policy is a constant policy.
Proposition 1. Suppose the function and the function x→ r(x)(1−F (x)) has
a unique optimum x∗ ∈ X. Then, the optimal policy is xt = x∗ for all t.
All proofs can be found in the supplemental material.
We sketch an argument why there exists a constant policy that is optimal.
Consider a policy that is increasing and suppose it is optimal.2 Then there
exists a time t such that xt = y < xt+1 = z. Compare these two actions with
the policy that would use action z at both time periods. First suppose θ < y;
then the user abandons under either alternative and so the outcome is identical.
Now consider θ ≥ y; then by the optimality of the first policy, given knowledge
that θ ≥ y, it is optimal to play z. But that means the constant policy is at
least as good as the optimal policy.
In the appendix, we provide another proof of the result using value iteration.
This proof also characterizes the optimal policy and optimal value exactly (as in
the proposition). Remarkably, the optimal policy is independent of the discount
factor γ.
Independent thresholds For completeness, we also note here the other ex-
treme case: suppose the thresholds θt are drawn independently from the same
distribution F at each t. Then since there is no correlation between time steps,
it follows immediately that the optimal policy is a constant policy, with a simple
form.
2It is clear that the optimal policy cannot be decreasing.
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Proposition 2. Then the optimal policy under the independent threshold as-
sumption is xt = x
∗ for all t if
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈X
r(x)(1− F (x))
1− γ(1− F (x)) (3)
is the unique optimum.
Robustness So far, we have considered two extreme threshold models and
have shown that constant policies, albeit different ones, are optimal. In this
section we look at the robustness of those results by understanding what happens
when we interpolate between the two sides by considering an additive noise
threshold model. Here, the threshold at time t consists of a fixed element
and independent noise: θt = θ + εt, where θ ∼ F is drawn once, and the
noise terms are drawn independently. In general, the optimal policy in this
model is increasing and intractable because the posterior over θ now depends
on all previous actions. However, there exists constant policies that are close to
optimal in case the noise terms are either small or large, reflecting our preceding
results in the extreme cases.
First consider the case where the noise terms are small. In particular, sup-
pose the error distribution has an arbitrary distribution over a small interval
[−y, y].
Proposition 3. Suppose εt ∈ [−y, y] and the reward function r is L-Lipschitz.
Then there exists a constant policy with value Vc such that
V ∗ − Vc ≤ 2yL
1− γ (4)
where V ∗ is the value of the optimal policy for the noise model, and x∗ is the
optimal constant policy for the noiseless case.
This result follows from comparing the most beneficial and detrimental sce-
narios; εt = y and εt = −y for all t, respectively, and nothing that in both cases
the optimal policies are constant policies, because thresholds are simply shifted.
We can then show that the optimal policy for the worst scenario achieves the
gap above compared to the optimal policy in the best case. The details can be
found in the appendix.
Similarly, when the noise level is sufficiently large with respect to the thresh-
old distribution F there also exists a constant policy that is close to optimal.
The intuition behind this is as follows. First, if the noise level is large, the plat-
form receives only little information at each step, and thus cannot efficiently
update the posterior on θ. Furthermore, the high variance in the thresholds
also reduces the expected lifetime of any policy. Combined, these two factors
make learning ineffective.
We formalize this by comparing a constant policy to an oracle policy that
knows θ but not the noise terms εt. Let G be the CDF of the noise distribution
εt with G¯ denoting its complement: G¯(y) = 1−G(y). Then we note that for a
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given threshold θ, the probability of survival is G¯(x− θ), and thus the expected
value for the constant policy xt = x for all t is
G¯(x− θ)r(x)
1− γG¯(x− θ) . (5)
Define the optimal constant policy given knowledge of the fixed part of the
threshold, θ by x(θ):
x(θ) = arg max
x
G¯(x− θ)r(x)
1− γG¯(x− θ) . (6)
We can furthermore define the value of policy xt = x(θ) when the threshold is
θ′ by v(θ, θ′):
v(θ, θ′) =
G¯(x(θ)− θ′)r(x(θ))
1− γG¯(x(θ)− θ′) . (7)
We note that v is non-decreasing in θ′. We assume that v is Lv-Lipschitz:
|v(θ, θ′)− v(s, θ′)| ≤ Lv|θ − s| (8)
for all θ and s. Note that noise distributions G that have high variance lead to
a smaller Lipschitz constant.
To state our result in this case, we define an η-cover, which is a simple notion
of the spread of a distribution.
Definition 1. An interval (l, u) provides an η cover for distribution F if F (u)−
F (l) > η.
In other words, with probability as least 1 − η, a random variable drawn
from distribution F lies in the interval (l, u).
Proposition 4. Assume r is bounded, and X is a continuous and connected
space. Suppose v defined above is Lv-Lipschitz, and there exists an η-cover
for threshold distribution Fθ with width w = u − l. Then the constant policy
xt =
l+u
2 with expected value Vθ satisfies
V ∗ − Vθ ≤ Vo − Vθ ≤ Lvw
2
+ 2
ηB
1− γ . (9)
The shape of v, and in particular its Lipschitz constant Lv depend on the
threshold distribution F and reward function r. As the noise distribution G
“widens”, Lv decreases. As a result, the bound above is most relevant when the
variance of G is substantial relative to spread of F .
To summarize, our results show that in the extreme cases where the thresh-
olds are drawn independently, or drawn once, there exists a constant policy
that is optimal. Further, the class of constant policies is robust when the joint
distribution over the thresholds is close to either of these scenarios.
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3 Learning thresholds
Thus far, we have assumed that the heterogeneity across the population and
the mean reward function are known to the platform, and we have focused on
personalization for a single user. It is natural to ask what the platform should
do when it lacks such knowledge, and in this section we show how the platform
can learn an optimal policy efficiently across the population. We study this
problem within the context of the fixed threshold model described above, as it
naturally lends itself to development of algorithms that learn about population-
level heterogeneity. In particular, we give theoretical performance guarantees
on a UCB type [Auer et al., 2002] algorithm, and show that a variant based
on MOSS [Audibert and Bubeck, 2009] performs better in practice. We also
empirically show that an explore-exploit strategy performs well.
Learning setting We focus our attention on the fixed threshold model, and
consider a setting where n users arrive sequentially, each with a fixed threshold
θu (u = 1, . . . , n) drawn from unknown distribution F with support on [0, 1].
To emphasize the role of learning from users over time, we consider a stylized
setting where the platform interacts with one user at a time, deciding on all the
actions and observing the outcomes for this user, before the next user arrives.
Inspired by our preceding analysis, we consider a proposed algorithm that uses
a constant policy for each user. Furthermore, we assume that the rewards
Rt(x) are bounded between 0 and 1, but otherwise drawn from an arbitrary
distribution that depends on x.
Regret with respect to oracle We measure the performance of learning
algorithms against the oracle that has full knowledge about the threshold dis-
tribution F and the reward function r, but no access to realizations of random
variables. As discussed in Section 2, the optimal policy for the oracle is thus to
play constant policy x∗ = maxx∈[0,1] r(x)(1− F (x)). We define regret as
regretn(A) = nr(x
∗)(1− F (x∗))
− (1− γ)
n∑
u=1
E
[
Tu−1∑
t=0
γtr(xu,t)
]
(10)
which we note is normalized on a per-user basis with respect to the discount
factor γ.
3.1 UCB strategy
We propose a UCB algorithm [Auer et al., 2002] on a suitably discretized space,
and prove an upper bound on its regret in terms of the number of users. This
approach is based on earlier work by [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003][Section
3] for learning demand curves. Before presenting the details, we introduce the
UCB algorithm for the standard multi-armed bandit problem.
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In the standard setting, there are K arms, each with its own mean µi. At
each time t, UCB(α) selects the arm with largest index Bi,t
Bi,t = X¯i,ni(t) + σ
√
2α log t
ni(t)
(11)
where ni(t) is the number of pulls of arm i at time t. We assume Bi,t = ∞ if
ni(t) = 0. The following lemma bounds the regret of the UCB index policy.
Lemma 5 (Theorem 2.1 [Bubeck et al., 2012]). Suppose rewards for each arm i
are independent across multiple pulls, σ-sub-Gaussian and have mean µi. Define
∆i = maxj µj − µi. Then, UCB(α) attains regret bound
regretn(UCB) ≤
∑
i:∆i>0
8ασ2
∆i
log n+
α
α− 2 . (12)
Kleinberg and Leighton [2003] adapt the above result to the problem of
demand curve learning. We follow their approach: Discretize the action space
and then use the standard UCB approach to find an approximately optimal
action. For each user, the algorithm selects a constant action xu and either
receives reward Ru = 0 if xu > θu or Ru =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tRt(xu).
We need to impose the following assumptions: θ ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ R(x) ≤M for
some M > 0, and the function f(x) = r(x)D(x) = r(x)(1 − F (x)) is strongly
convex and thus has a unique maximum at x∗.
Assumption 1 (Lemma 3.11 in Leighton and Kleinberg). There exists con-
stants c1 and c2 such that
c1(x
∗ − x)2 < f(x∗)− f(x) < c2(x∗ − x)2 (13)
for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Using these assumptions, we can prove the main learning result.
Theorem 6. Suppose that f satisfies the concavity condition above. Then
UCB(α) on the discretized space with K = O
(
(n/ log n)1/4
)
arms satisfies
regretn(UCB) ≤ O
(√
n log n
)
(14)
for all α > 2.
The proof consists of two parts, first we use Lemma 1 to bound the difference
between the best action and the best arm in the discretized action space. Then
we use Theorem 5 to show that the learning strategy has small regret compared
to the best arm. Combined, these prove the result.
It is important to note that the algorithm requires prior knowledge of the
number of users, n. In practice it is reasonable to assume that a platform is able
to estimate this accurately, but otherwise the well-known doubling trick can be
employed at a slight cost.
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3.2 Lower bound
We now briefly discuss lower bounds on learning algorithms. If we restrict
ourselves to algorithms that play a constant policy for each user, the lower
bound in Kleinberg and Leighton [2003] applies immediately.
Proposition 7 (Theorem 3.9 in Kleinberg and Leighton [2003]). Any learning
algorithm A that plays a constant policy for each user, has regret at least
regretn(A) ≥ Ω(
√
n) (15)
for some threshold distribution.
Thus, the discretized UCB strategy is near-optimal in the class of constant
policies.
However, algorithms with dynamic policies for users can obtain more infor-
mation on the user’s threshold and therefore more easily estimate the empirical
distribution function. Whether the O(
√
n) lower bound carries over to dynamic
policies is an open problem.
3.3 Simulations
In this section, we empirically compare the performance of the discretized UCB
against other policies. For our simulations, we also include the MOSS algorithm
[Audibert and Bubeck, 2009], and an explore-exploit strategy.
MOSS Audibert and Bubeck [2009] give a upper confidence bound algorithm
that has a tighter regret bound in the standard multi-armed bandit problem.
The MOSS algorithm is an index policy where the index for arm i is given by
Bi,t = X¯i,ni(t) +
√(
log
t
Kni(t)
)
+
/ni(t) (16)
While the policy is quite similar to the UCB algorithm, it does not suffer from
an extra
√
log n term in the regret bound. However, we cannot adapt the bound
to the abandonment setting, due to worse dependence on the number of arms.
In practice, we expect this algorithm to perform better than the UCB algorithm,
as it is a superior multi-armed bandit algorithm.
Explore-exploit strategy Next, we consider an explore-exploit strategy that
first estimates an empirical distribution function, and then uses that to optimize
a constant policy. For this algorithm, we assume that for zero reward, the
learner can observe θu for a particular user, which mimics a strategy where the
learner increases its action by ε at each time period to learn the threshold θu
of a particular user with arbitrary precision. Because it directly estimates the
empirical distribution function and does not require discretization, it is better
able to capture the structure of our model.
The explore-exploit strategy consists of two stages.
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• First, obtain m samples of θu to find an empirical estimate of F , which
we denote by Fˆm
• For the remaining users, play constant policy xu = arg max r(x)(1 −
Fˆm(x))
Note that compared to the previous algorithm, we assume this learner has access
to the reward function, and only the threshold distribution F is unknown. If
the signal-to-noise ratio in the stochastic rewards is large, this is not unrealistic:
the platform, while exploring, is able to observe a large number of rewards and
should therefore be able to estimate the reward function reasonably well.
Setup For simplicity, our simulations focus on a stylized setting; we observed
similar results under different scenarios.3 We assume that the rewards are deter-
ministic and follow the identity function r(x) = x, and the threshold distribution
(unknown to the learning algorithm) is uniform on [0, 1]. For each algorithm, we
run 50 repetitions for n = 2000 time steps, and plot all cumulative regret paths.
For the discretized policies, we set K ≈ 2.5
(
n
logn
)1/4
= 12. The explore-exploit
strategy first observes 20+2
√
n = 110 samples to estimate F , before committing
to a fixed strategy.
Results The cumulative regret paths are shown in Figure 1. We observe that
MOSS, while having higher variance, indeed performs better than the standard
UCB algorithm, despite the lack of a theoretical bound.
However, the explore-exploit strategy obtains the lowest regret. First, since
it is aware of the reward function, it has less uncertainty. More importantly, the
algorithm leverages the structure of the problem because it does not discretize
the action space and then treat actions independently. Finally, we note that
when rewards are stochastic, the UCB and MOSS are even worse compared to
explore-exploit, as they have to estimate the mean reward function, while the
explore-exploit strategy assumes it is given.
4 Feedback
In this section, we consider a “softer” version of abandonment, where the plat-
form receives some feedback before the user abandons. As example, consider
optimizing the number of push notifications. When a user receives a notification,
she may decide to open the app, or decide to turn off notifications. However,
her most likely action is to ignore the notification. The platform can interpret
this as a signal of dissatisfaction, and work to improve the policy.
In this section, we augment our model to capture such effects. While the
solution to this updated model is intractable, we discuss interesting structure
3Code to replicate the simulations under a variety of scenarios is available at https://
github.com/schmit/learning-abandonment.
10
0 1000 2000
mean regret: 104.9
0
50
100
150
ucb
0 1000 2000
mean regret: 79.7
0
50
100
150
moss
0 1000 2000
mean regret: 36.4
0
50
100
150
explore-exploit
Figure 1: Cumulative regret plots for r(x) = x and F = U [0, 1].
that the optimal policy exhibits: partial learning, and the aggressiveness of the
optimal policy.
Feedback model To incorporate user feedback, we expand the model as fol-
lows. Suppose that whenever the current action xt exceeds the threshold (i.e.,
xt > θt), then with probability p we receive no reward but the user remains,
and with probability 1 − p the user abandons. Further, we assume that the
platform at time t both observes the reward R(xt), if rewarded, and an indica-
tor Zt = Ixt>θt . This is equivalent to assuming that a user has geometrically
distributed patience; the number of times she allows the platform to cross her
threshold.
As before the goal is to maximize expected discounted reward. Note that
because the platform does not receive a reward when the threshold is crossed, the
problem is nontrivial even when p = 1. We restrict our attention to the single
threshold model, where θ is drawn once and then fixed for all time periods.
Figure 2 shows the numerically computed optimal policy when the threshold
distribution is uniform on [0, 1], the reward function is r(x) = x, the probability
of abandonment p = 0.5 and γ = 0.9. Depending on whether or not a feedback
signal is received, the optimal policy follows the green or the red line as we step
through time from left to right.
We note that one can think of the optimal policy as a form of bisection,
though it does not explore the entire domain of F . In particular it is conservative
regarding users with large θ. For example, consider a user with threshold 0.9.
While the policy is initially increasing and thus partially personalizes to her
threshold, xt does not converge to 0.9, and in fact never comes close. We call
this partial learning ; in the next section, we demonstrate that this is a key
feature of the optimal policy in general.
Partial learning Partial learning refers to the fact that the optimal policy
does not fully reduce its uncertainty (the posterior) on θ. Initially, the policy
learns about the threshold using a bisection-type search. However, at some
point (dependent on the user’s threshold), further learning is too risky and the
11
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Figure 2: Visualization of optimal policy when discount factor γ = 0.9 in the
p = 0.5 model. Follow the tree from left to right, where if Zt = 0 (reward
obtained) the next action follows from following the green line, and if Zt = 1,
the optimal action is given by the point following the red line if the user has
not abandoned.
optimal policy switches to a constant policy. We note that this happens even
when there is no risk of abandonment at all (p = 1), because at some point
even the risk of losing a reward is not offset by potential gains in getting a more
accurate posterior on θ. Partial learning occurs under some regularity conditions
on the threshold distribution that ensures the posterior does not collapse, and
is Lipschitz as defined in the following paragraph.
Write Ful for the posterior distribution over θ given lower bound l and upper
bound u based on previous actions
Ful (y) = P(l + y < θ | l < θ < u) =
F (u)− F (l + y)
F (u)− F (l) . (17)
We say the that the posterior distribution is non-degenerate if the following
condition holds:
Definition 2 (Non-degenerate posterior distribution ). For all λ > 0, there
exists a ν such that for all l, u where u− l < ν, Ful (ε) < 1− λε for 0 < ε < ν.
Thus, for sufficiently small intervals, the conditional probability decreases
rapidly as we move away from the lower bound of the interval. Suppose F is
such that the posterior is non-degenerate and is Lipschitz in the following sense.
Assumption 2 (Lipschitz continuity of conditional distribution). There exists
an L′ > 0 such that for all intervals [l, u] and all 0 < y < u− l, we have
p(y | l + ε, u)− p(y | l, u) ≤ εL′. (18)
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We can use this assumption to show that the value function corresponding
to the dynamic program that models the feedback model is Lipschitz.
Lemma 8 (Lipschitz continuity of value function). Consider a bounded action
space X. If p is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant Lp, and the reward function
r is bounded by B, there exists constant LV such that for all l < u
V (l + ε, u)− V (l, u) ≤ εLV . (19)
Using these assumptions, we can then prove that the optimal policy exhibits
partial learning, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose r is increasing, Lr-Lipschitz, non-zero on the interior
of X and bounded by B. Furthermore, assume p is non-degenerate and Lipschitz
as defined above. For all u ∈ Int(X) there exists an ε(u) > 0 such that for all l
where u− l < ε(u), the optimal action in state (l, u) is l, that is
V (l, u) =
r(l)
1− γ . (20)
Furthermore, ε(u) is non-decreasing in u.
We prove this result by analyzing the value function of the corresponding
dynamic program. The result shows that at some point, the potential gains from
a better posterior for the threshold are not worth the risk of abandonment. This
is especially true when θ is quite likely under the posterior. If, to the contrary,
we belief the threshold is small, there is little to lose in experimentation. Note
however that the result also holds for p = 1, where there are only signals and no
abandonment. In this case the risk of a signal (and no reward for the current
timestep), outweights (all) possible future gains. Naturally, if the probability of
override is small (i.e. p is small), the condition on λ also weakens, leading to
larger intervals of constant policies.
Aggressive and conservative policies Another salient feature of the struc-
ture of optimal policies in the feedback model is the aggressiveness of the policy.
In particular, we say a policy is aggressive if the first action x0 is larger than the
optimal constant policy x∗ in the absence of feedback (corresponding to p = 0),
and conservative if it is smaller. As noted before, when there is no feedback,
there is no benefit to adapting to user thresholds. However, there is value in
personalization when users give feedback.
Empirically, we find that when there is low risk of abandonment, i.e., p ≈ 1,
then the optimal policy is aggressive. In this case, the optimal policy can ag-
gressively target high-value users because other users are unlikely to abandon
immediately. Thus the policy can personalize to high-value users in later peri-
ods.
However, when the risk of abandonment is large (p ≈ 0) and the discount
factor is sufficiently close to one, the optimal policy is more conservative than the
optimal constant policy when p = 0. In this case, the high risk of abandonment
13
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Figure 3: The relation between the override probability p and the (approxi-
mate) optimal initial action x0 when the discount factor γ = 0.9. The artifacts
in the plot are due to the discretization error from numerical computations.
forces the policy to be careful: over a longer horizon the algorithm can extract
value even from a low value user, but it has to be careful not to lose her in the
first few periods. This long term value of a user with low threshold makes up
for the loss in immediate reward gained from aggressively targeting users with
a high threshold. Figure 3 illustrates this effect. Here, we use deterministic
rewards r(x) = x and the threshold distribution is uniform F = U [0, 1], but a
similar effect is observed for other distributions and reward functions as well.
5 Conclusion
When machine learning algorithms are deployed in settings where they interact
with people, it is important to understand how user behavior affects these al-
gorithm. In this work, we propose a novel model for personalization that takes
into account the risk that a dissatisfied user abandons the platform.
This leads to some unexpected results. We show that constant policies are
optimal under fixed threshold and independent threshold models. We have
shown that under small perturbations of these models, constant policies are
“robust” (i.e., perform well in the perturbed model), though in general finding
an optimal policy becomes intractable.
In a setting where a platform faces many users, but does not know the reward
function nor population distribution over threshold, under suitable assumptions
we have shown that UCB-type algorithms perform well, both theoretically by
providing regret bounds and running simulations. We also consider an explore-
exploit strategy that is more efficient in practice, but it requires knowledge of
14
the reward function.
Feedback from users leads to more sophisticated optimal learning strategies
that exhibit partial learning; the optimal learning algorithm personalizes to a
certain degree to each user. Also, we have found that the optimal policy is more
conservative when the probability of abandonment is high, and aggressive when
that probability is low.
5.1 Further directions
There are several interesting directions of further research that are outside the
scope of this work.
Abandonment models First, more sophisticated behaviour on user aban-
donment should be considered. This could take many forms, such as a total
patience budget that gets depleted as the threshold is crossed. Another model
is that of a user playing a learning strategy herself, comparing this platform
to one or multiple outside options. In this scenario, the user and platform are
simultaneously learning about each other.
User information Second, we have not considered additional user informa-
tion in terms of covariates. In the notification example, user activity seems like
an important signal of her preferences. Models that are able to incorporate such
information and are able to infer the parameters from data are beyond the scope
of this work but an important direction of further research.
Empirical analysis This work focuses on theoretical understanding of the
abandonment model, and thus ignores important aspects of a real world system.
We believe there is a lot of potential to gain additional insight from an empirical
perspective using real-world systems with abandonment risk.
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A Proofs
A.1 Threshold models
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from defining an appropriate dynamic
program and solving it using value iteration. We will denote the state by x,
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denoting the best lower bound on c. In practice, if the process survives up to
time t (T > t) the state is x = maxs≤t xs. Furthermore, it is convenient to use
the survival function S(x) = 1− F (x).
It is easy to see that the optimal policy is non-decreasing, so we can restrict
our focus to non-decreasing policies.
The Bellman equation for the value function at state x is given by
V (x) = max
y≥x
S(y)
S(x)
(r(y) + γV (y)). (21)
For convenience we define the following transformation J(x) = S(x)V (x) and
note that we can equivalently use J to find the optimal policy. We now explicitly
compute the limit of value iteration to find J(x). Start with J0(x) = 0 for all x
and note that the iteration takes the form
Jk+1 = max
y≥x
S(y)r(y) + γJk(y) = max
y≥x
p(y) + γJk(y). (22)
We prove the following two properties by induction for all k > 0:
1. Jk(x) = p(x
∗)
∑k−1
i=0 γi for all x ≤ x∗.
2. Jk(x) < Jk(x
∗) for all x > x∗.
The above is immediately true for k = 1. Now assume it is true for an arbitrary
k, then
Jk+1(x) = p(x
∗) + γJk(x∗) for all x ≤ x∗ (23)
and
Jk+1(x) < p(x
∗) + γJk(x∗) = Jk+1(x∗) for all x > x∗. (24)
The result follows from taking the limit as k →∞ and noting that for any state
x ≤ x∗, it is optimal to jump to state x∗ (and stay there). We also immediately
see that the value of the optimal policy thus is p(x)/γ, as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is immediate that the optimal policy must be con-
stant; if the process survives xt = x, then at time t + 1 we face the same
problem as at time t. So whatever action is optimal at time t, is also optimal
at time t + 1. Let V (x) denote the value of playing xt = x for all t. Then the
following relation holds
V (x) = (1− F (x))(r(x) + γV (x)) (25)
which leads to
V (x) =
r(x)(1− F (x))
1− γ(1− F (x)) . (26)
The result now follows immediately.
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A.2 Robustness
Proof of Proposition 3. First we consider the constant policy xt = x
∗−y for all
t in the noiseless case. We note that
r(x∗ − y)S(x∗ − y) ≥ (r(x∗)− yL)S(x∗) ≥ V (x∗)− yL (27)
where V (x∗) is the value of the optimal constant policy for the noise-free model.
Now let us consider the best possible noise model, then εt = y for all t.
But this is equivalent to the noise-free model with the threshold shifted by y.
Hence, we know that a constant policy is optimal. We can bound the value of
this model by
max
x
r(x)S(x− y) = max
x
r(x+ y)S(x) (28)
≤ max
x
(r(x) + yL)S(x) (29)
= max
x
r(x)S(x) + yLS(x) (30)
≤ max
x
r(x)S(x) + yL (31)
= V (x∗) + yL (32)
Hence, this implies that the constant policy xt = x
∗ − y is at most 2yL1−γ worse
than the optimal policy for the most optimistic noise model.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let θ¯ be the midpoint of the η cover, c = l+u2 . Now we
bound the expected value of an oracle policy, i.e. a policy that knows the true
threshold θ∗ as follows
E(v(θ∗, θ∗)) ≤ 2ηB
1− γ +
∫ u
l
v(θ∗, θ∗)dFθ
≤ 2ηB
1− γ +
∫ u
l
v(θ∗, θ∗) + L|θ¯ − θ∗|dFθ
≤ 2ηB
1− γ +
∫ u
l
v(θ¯, θ∗) + L
u− l
2
dFθ
≤ E(v(θ¯, θ∗)) + 2ηB
1− γ + (1− η)
Lw
2
which completes the proof.
A.3 Learning
Proof of Proposition 6. Due to the discretization, the proof consists of two parts.
First, we show that the policy that plays the best arm i∗ suffers small regret
with respect to the optimal policy. Then we use the UCB regret bound to show
that the learning strategy has low regret with respect to the playing arm i∗.
Thus we can decompose regret into
regret(UCB) = regretD + regretU (33)
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where the first term corresponds to the discretization error and the second from
the learning policy. Due to the time horizon and discounting, we write
Let x∗ be the optimal strategy, i.e. it maxizimes r(x)D(x). Then the dis-
cretization error from playing i∗/K, by Assumption 1 is
regretD ≤
c2n
2K2
=
c2
√
n log n
2
. (34)
Thus, the error due to the discretization is small.
Now let us bound the UCB regret with respect to action i∗/K. As Kleinberg
and Leighton (2003) note, the assumption that the pulls of different arms are
independent is not used in the proof. Thus we can apply Lemma 5. First, we
show that the arms are sub-Gaussian. Since the rewards are bounded by 1 and
independent across time, straightforward calculation shows that
Var
(
(1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtRt(x)
)
=
(1− γ)2
4(1− γ2) ≤
1
4
. (35)
Then using the law of total variance, conditioning on the event x < θu, the
variance of the total obtained reward for user u, Ru, can be bounded by
Var (Ru) = E(Var (Ru | θu)) + Var (E(Ru | θu)) (36)
=
(1− F (xu))M2
4
+ (r(xu))
2
F (xu)(1− F (xu)) (37)
≤M2/2 (38)
Thus we find that the reward for users is sub-Gaussian with parameter σ = M
2
2 .
Recall the UCB regret bound
regret(UCB) ≤
∑
i:∆i>0
8ασ2
∆i
log n+
α
α− 2 . (39)
We now focus on the
∑K
i=1:∆i>0
1
∆i
term. Let ∆(1) ≤ ∆(2) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(K−1)
denote the ordered gaps with respect to the optimal arm. Note that for j ≥ 2,
we know ∆(j) > c1(
j
2K )
2 due to Assumption 1. However, for the smallest gap,
we only know 0 ≤ ∆(1) ≤ c2K2 , depending how close i∗/K is to x∗. We thus
obtain
K∑
i=1
1
∆i
=
K−1∑
i=1
1
∆(i)
(40)
=
1
∆(1)
+
∑
i≥2
1
∆(j)
(41)
≤ 1
∆(1)
+
4K2
c1
∑
j−1 (42)
≤ 1
∆(1)
+
2pi2
3c1
K2 (43)
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Thus regret is bounded by
regretU ≤
8ασ2 log n
∆(1)
+
16ασ2pi2
3c1
(K − 2)2 log n+K α
α− 2 (44)
However, the regret from due to playing the second best action is trivially
bounded by n∆(1). Thus, we can bound the worst case when ∆(1) = 4
√
log n/n.
This leads to a bound of
regretU ≤ 2ασ2
√
n log n+
16ασ2pi2
3c1
(K − 2)2 log n+K α
α− 2 (45)
since there are K = (n/ log n)1/4 arms, we get
regretu ≤ 2ασ2
√
n log n+
16ασ2pi2
3c1
√
n log n+ o(
√
n log n) (46)
Combining this with the bound on regretD completes the proof.
A.4 Feedback
Proof of Lemma 8. The Bellman equation of the dynamic program for the feed-
back model can be written as:
V (l, u) = max
l≤y≤u
F (u)− F (y)
F (u)− F (l) (r(y) + γV (y, u)) +
F (y)− F (l)
F (u)− F (l)γV (l, y) (47)
where l and u are the lower bounds and upper bounds on c based on the history.
Note that V is finite and therefore value iteration converges pointwise to
V . We use induction on the value iterates to find the Lipschitz constant for
V . Let V0, V1, . . . indicate the value iterates. Since V0(l, u) = 0 for all states
(l, u), the Lipschitz constant for V0, denoted by L0 = 0. We further claim that
Ln+1 = Lp
B
1−γ + βγLn. Suppose this is true for n = 1, . . . , i − 1, then for
n = i+ 1 we consider state (l+ ε, u) and write x∗ for the optimal action in that
state, and y∗ = x∗ − l. Then
Vi+1(l, u) ≥ p(y∗ | l, u)(r(x∗) + γV (x∗, u)) + (1− p(y∗ | l, u))βγV (l, x∗) (48)
Also, V (l, x∗) ≤ V (l, u). Then we find
Vi+1(l + ε, u)− Vi+1(l, u) ≤ [p(y∗ | l + ε, u)− p(y∗ | l, u)] (r(x∗) + γVi(x∗, u))
+ (1− p(y∗ | l + ε, u))βγVi(l + ε, x∗)− (1− p(y∗ | l, u)βγVi(l, x∗) (49)
Using the Lipschitz continuity of p we can bound
p(y∗ | l + ε, u)− p(y∗ | l, u) ≤ εLp. (50)
Then note that
r(x∗) + γV (x∗, u) ≤ B
1− γ (51)
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and for the final two terms we note
(1− p(y∗ | l + ε, u))βγVi(l + ε, x∗)− (1− p(y∗ | l, u)βγVi(l, x∗)
≤ βγ(Vi(l + ε, x∗)− Vi(l, x∗)) ≤ βγεLi (52)
where we use the inductive assumption. Because l, u and ε are arbitrary, we see
that
Ln ≤ L
′B
(1− βγ)(1− γ) . (53)
which implies V is Lipschitz.
Proof of Proposition 9. First we note that by Lemma 8, V is Lipschitz, and we
write Lv for its Lipschitz constant. Fix u, and consider a state (u − ν, u) for
some ν > 0. For notational convenience, for action x we write y = x− (u− ν)
for the difference from the lower bound. We also use the shorthand l = u − ν
and p(y) = p(y | l, u). We can upperbound the value function by
V (l, u) = max
y
p(y)[r(x) + γV (x, u)] + (1− p(y))βγV (l, x) (54)
≤ p(y)[r(l) + Lry + γV (l, u) (55)
+ γLvy] + (1− p(y))βγV (l, u) (56)
≤ (1− λ(ν)y)[r(l) + γV (l, u) + Ly] (57)
+ λ(ν)yβγV (l, u) (58)
where we write L = Lr + γLv and use the non-degeneracy of p. The derivative
for the above expression with respect to y is
(1− 2λ(ν))Ly + L− λ(ν)r(l)− γλ(ν)(1− β)V (l, u)
≤ (1− 2λ(ν))Ly + L− λ(ν)r(l). (59)
Since r(l) > 0 for all l ∈ IntX, for ν sufficiently small this derivative is negative
for all y ≥ 0. To complete the proof, we need this upperbound to be tight at
y = 0, which follows immediately
(1− λ(ν)y)[r(l) + γV (l, u) + Ly] + λ(ν)yβγV (l, u)|y=0 =
r(l) + γV (l, u) ≥ r(l)
1− γ . (60)
Since r is increasing, it follows immediately that ε(u) is non-decreasing in u.
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